Token theory, source-published capital bases and explicitly labeled attribution drafts. The browser does not infer economic relationships.
The authored mechanisms and the origins of value they reference.
CRV possesses a single large VCM composed of three sub-VCMs. One is exactly equivalent to a regular Yield-Bearing Staking Token, encapsulating the unconditional distribution of fees to all veCRV holders. Another is the classical Governance Token. The third encompasses the acquisition of liquidity boost by the liquidity providers that also possess veCRV.
This token function represents the value received in the form of a cashflow by all veCRV holders. This value is delivered to all stakers of CRV in the form of the fees generated by Curve and crvUSD administration fees. This cashflow in contingent only on locking the CRV token to obtain veCRV. The exact portion of fees paid to locked token positions is defined by the governable parameters of the protocol, such as the FeeSplitter parameter governing the split of the crvUSD fees.
This token function represents tangible and intangible value derived from controlling the decision-making regarding resources, parameters, or updates on the protocol level. The requirement for obtaining governance power is locking the CRV token in the vote-escrow contract. The governance power and related value can be obtained only after locking CRV (action which corresponds to the Risk Exposure) and casting a vote (the Conditional Action). The governance of the protocol controls a number of protocol parameters, the distributions of several income streams, and a countable number of improvement proposals, current and future (more details in the VCIP section).
This token function represents the ability to generate additional yield for a liquidity provider with veCRV locked position. This value is delivered to veCRV stakers who provide liquidity and received in the form of a boost, which is applied based on the relative weight of the liquidity provider's veCRV position within a given pool. The boost multiplies the LP reward when distributing the epochal gauge allocations within the pool.
A self-contained token attribution packet. Its values resolve to stored source observations; the browser does not calculate them.
A.1
Funding source → mechanism → ruling
Each candidate holder cashflow is grouped by who funds it and tested before it enters a valuation multiple.
Attribution draftProvider bindings use the analyst-final CRV sources; funding, treatment and test outcomes still require researcher review.
Methodology draftShared funding, treatment and admission-test definitions require researcher review.
CRV
What reaches a veCRV holder
Operations
The protocol earns it.
crvUSD fees distributed through the Curve fee-distribution path.
Annual fees
$7,834,951
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
Draft — credit the source-published annual fee stream to the veCRV holder population.
Counterparty
An external party funds it.
Vote incentives added by external counterparties for a voting epoch.
Annual added bribes
$25,538,839
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
Draft — use added rather than claimed bribes; holder entitlement and final treatment still require review.
External
Value enters from outside the token supply.
Claimable
The eligible holder has a defined path to receive the value.
Dated
The value is published as a dated source series.
Scales
The value scales with protocol activity rather than token issuance.
A.2
Supply → eligible population, condition by condition
Each holder cashflow uses the CRV population that can actually receive it. The ordered stages show where each credited leg reaches its final capital base.
Eligibility draftPopulation bindings use the accepted query 8030896 mapping; stage wording and cashflow endpoints still require researcher review.
Stages are ordered. Rails show sequence only; their widths are not data.
01
all
CRV included by the source query
Baseline capital base before a holder-entitlement condition is applied.
Market cap
$882,968,760
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
02
locked
Held in Curve VotingEscrow
CRV held by the voting-escrow contract on the observation day.
Effective market cap
$155,876,700
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
03
ve
Lock-duration-weighted voting power
Voting power after the remaining lock time weights the locked CRV position.
Effective market cap
$285,046,870
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
Capital base for Fees
04
ve_direct
Convex CurveVoterProxy excluded
Direct voting supply used by q803 for bribes after excluding the Convex wrapper balance.
Effective market cap
$131,272,670
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
Capital base for Added bribes
A.2 · scenarios
Capital base → holder cashflow → source multiple
q803 publishes one adopted fees family and four comparison families. Base P/FCF remains visible as structurally unavailable because ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
Scenarios draftMetric families use the accepted query 8030896 mapping; scenario names and economic interpretation still require researcher review.
The comparison is retained explicitly as unavailable rather than omitted or represented by a null source column.
Accounted market cap
$882,968,760
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
7d
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
30d
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
90d
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
180d
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
365d
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
ann.
Unavailable — Ordinary CRV holders receive no source-backed passive cashflow.
This is the only q803 valuation family marked adopted.
veCRV voting capital
$285,046,870
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
7d
57.77×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
30d
51.43×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
90d
51.35×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
180d
52.16×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
365d
35.45×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
ann.
35.45×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
This source family is distinct from the added-bribes attribution leg in A.1; their relationship is not yet approved.
Direct veCRV voting capital
$131,272,670
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
7d
25.82×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
30d
33.13×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
90d
32.17×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
180d
23.77×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
365d
14.49×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
ann.
14.49×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
The latest source does not pool both legs into one locked capital base.
Fees and bribes use locked CRV and locked CRV less Convex, so this family has no single capital base.
7d
20.62×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
30d
23.12×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
90d
22.71×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
180d
18.87×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
365d
11.91×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
ann.
11.91×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
The source names this family max; it is not a pooled cashflow divided by one capital base.
Fees and bribes use different eligible populations, so this family has no single capital base.
7d
17.84×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
30d
20.15×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
90d
19.78×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
180d
16.33×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
365d
10.29×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
ann.
10.29×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
The source column is named agg and divides the pooled cashflow into accounted market cap; the reader-facing label is Aggregate P/FCF.
Accounted market cap
$882,968,760
through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune
7d
88.14×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
30d
92.89×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
90d
91.67×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
180d
80.37×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
365d
51.64×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
ann.
51.64×
through Sep 2, 2026 · multiple · dune
A.3
Origin · claimant · delivery · claim basis · value
The same cashflow legs shown in A.1, presented as comparable authored fields.
| Leg | Origin | Claimant | Delivery | Claim basis | Treatment | Source value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fees | Operations | veCRV holder | Curve fee-distribution path | veCRV balance at the distribution snapshot | Credited — full weight | Annual fees $7,834,951 through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune |
| Added bribes | Counterparty | Direct veCRV voter | Vote-incentive claim path | Direct voting weight in the incentive epoch | Credited — qualified | Annual added bribes $25,538,839 through Sep 2, 2026 · money · dune |
A.4
Global rules · token rulings
Shared comparison rules followed by the rulings applied to this token’s cashflow legs.
One dollar of project-created value delivered to an eligible holder is counted independently of the delivery mechanism.
Token issuance and dilution are disclosed separately and never added to project-created holder cashflow.
Each cashflow leg keeps its own eligible population and multiple; unlike legs are not hidden inside one blended comparison.
Base represents the ordinary holder, Aggregate uses total market cap over deduplicated holder cashflow, and Max represents the highest supported participation scenario.
Draft — credit the source-published annual fee stream to the veCRV holder population.
Draft — use added rather than claimed bribes; holder entitlement and final treatment still require review.
Definitions, eligibility conditions and supporting authored material for this token.